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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
The following scholars are experts on the history
and original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Amici have published books or law review articles on
the subject and teach courses in constitutional law,
criminal procedure, and other topics:
Danielle Citron, Morton & Sophia Macht Professor
of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law
Morgan Cloud, Charles Howard Candler Professor
of Law, Emory University
Bradford Colbert, Resident Adjunct Professor,
Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Dr. William Cuddihy, Adjunct Associate Professor
of History, Los Angeles City College
Laura K. Donohue, Professor of Law, Georgetown
Law
Norman M. Garland, Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School
David Gray, Professor of Law, University of Maryland Carey School of Law
Margaret Hu, Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law

1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief and their
letters of consent have been filed with the Clerk. Under Rule 37.6
of the Rules of this Court, amici state that no counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no counsel or party
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief. No person other than amici or their
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
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Renée McDonald Hutchins, Jacob A. France Professor of Public Interest Law, University of Maryland
Carey School of Law
Tracey Maclin, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Luke Milligan, Professor of Law, Louis D.
Brandeis School of Law, University of Louisville
George C. Thomas III, Board of Governors Professor of Law and Judge Alexander P. Waugh, Sr. Distinguished Scholar, Rutgers School of Law2
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Law enforcement officials wanted to learn where
Petitioner Timothy Carpenter was at the time of certain robberies. To figure that out, they obtained records from his cellular service provider showing the
movements of his cell phone. Examining those records, they were able to track Carpenter’s whereabouts
over a four-month period.
Obtaining and examining those records was a
“search” in any normal sense of the word—a search of
documents and a search for Carpenter and one of his
personal effects. It was therefore a “search” within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. When the
Amendment was ratified, to “search” meant to “examine,” “explore,” “look through,” “inquire,” “seek,” or “try
to find.” Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English
Language (10th ed. 1792). Nothing about the text of
the Fourth Amendment, or the historical backdrop
against which it was adopted, suggests that the term
“search” should be construed more narrowly in that
Amendment to mean only conduct violating “an actual
2

Institution names are provided for purposes of affiliation only.
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(subjective) expectation of privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Plainly, by examining and looking through Carpenter’s cell site location records to seek the whereabouts of his person and phone, the government agents
in this case conducted a “search.”
Entrusting government agents with unfettered
discretion to conduct searches using cell site location
information undermines Fourth Amendment rights.
The Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV (emphasis added). The Framers chose that
language deliberately. It reflected the insecurity they
suffered under the British at the hands of “writs of assistance,” a form of general warrant that granted state
agents broad discretion to search wherever they
pleased. Such arbitrary power was “unreasonable” to
the Framers, being “against the reason of the common
law,” Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1181, 1270 (2016), and it was
intolerable because of its oppressive impact on “the
people” as a whole. As emphasized in one of the seminal English cases that inspired the Amendment, this
kind of general power to search was “totally subversive
of the liberty of the subject.” Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng.
Rep. 489, 498 (1763). James Otis’s famous speech denouncing a colonial writ of assistance similarly condemned those writs as “the worst instrument of arbitrary power,” placing “the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer.” James Otis, In Opposition to Writs of Assistance (1761), available at
http://bartleby.com/268/8/9.
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Thus, although those who drafted and ratified the
Fourth Amendment could not have anticipated cellphone technology, they would have recognized the
dangers inherent in any state claim of unlimited authority to conduct searches for evidence of criminal activity. Cell site location information provides insight
into where we go and what we do—potentially revealing one’s intimate relationships, hobbies, predilections, medical conditions, religious beliefs, and political pursuits. Because this information is constantly
generated and can be retrieved by the government
long after the activities it memorializes have taken
place, unfettered government access to cell site location information raises the specter of general searches
and undermines the security of “the people.”
The use of more primitive techniques to track a
person’s movements, such as live visual surveillance
in public spaces, does not pose the same threat to the
security of the people. Traditional methods require
considerable time and resources, making their use limited and infrequent. “The people” can therefore remain secure in their persons and effects against the
fear that police might track their movements without
a compelling reason to do so. See United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy were neither constitutional
nor statutory, but practical.”).
Today, however, ubiquitous personal electronic devices generate perpetual records of almost everyone’s
movements, “mak[ing] long-term monitoring [of the
people] relatively easy and cheap.” Id. These developments have fundamentally transformed the state’s capacity to track and monitor the people. David Gray,
The Fourth Amendment in an Age of Surveillance 124
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(2017) (“[W]hat is troubling about life in our age of surveillance is the prospect of living in a world where each
of us and all of us are subject to the constant and real
threat of broad and indiscriminate surveillance.”).
And if left unchecked, such developments will “alter
the relationship between citizen and government in a
way that is inimical to democratic society.” Jones, 565
U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Searches conducted using cell site location information raise precisely this danger. Today, “it is the
person who is not carrying a cell phone . . . who is the
exception,” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490
(2014), and “nearly three-quarters of smart phone users [have] report[ed] being within five feet of their
phones most of the time.” Id. All of these “cell-phone
user[s] must reveal [their] general location to a cell
tower in order for the cellular service provider to connect a call.” Cert. Opp. 15 (emphasis added). Because
anyone who uses this basic tool of modern life has no
choice but to create a perpetual digital trail of his or
her movements, the rise of modern cell phones has effectively enabled “twenty-four hour surveillance of any
citizen of this country.” United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 283 (1983). Unfettered government access to
that data is incompatible with “a society which chooses
to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948).
Although the procedures set forth in the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”) may limit the government’s access to cell site location information, see
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), the Act was passed long before access to telephone records allowed comprehensive
tracking of subscribers’ movements. As a consequence,

6
the SCA does not require sufficiently rigorous justifications for government access to this revealing data.
Neither does the Act adequately limit the breadth of
searches conducted using cell site location information. That shortcoming is evident in this case,
where investigators needed location information only
for specific times and dates, Pet. App. 6a, but requested and received location data covering more than
four months, Pet’r Br. 6-7 & n.4; see Pet. App. 52a. Because of these flaws, the SCA does not sufficiently
guard against threats of unreasonable searches and
seizures.
ARGUMENT
I. Seeking the Whereabouts of a Person or Her
Effects by Examining Cell Site Location
Information Is a “Search”
A. “Words in a constitution . . . are always to be
given the meaning they have in common use, unless
there are very strong reasons to the contrary.” State
of Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139, 147 (1886).
“Ordinarily courts do not construe words used in the
Constitution so as to give them a meaning more narrow than one which they had in the common parlance
of the times in which the Constitution was written.”
United States v. S.-E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S.
533, 539 (1944).
“When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as
now, to ‘search’ meant ‘[t]o look over or through for the
purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine
by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to
search the wood for a thief.’” Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 32 n.1 (2001) (quoting Noah Webster, An
American Dictionary of the English Language (1828));
see Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, supra (defining “search” as to “examine,” “explore,” “look
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through,” “inquire,” “seek,” or “try to find” by “looking
into every suspected place”).
Nothing about the text of the Fourth Amendment
or the historical context in which it was adopted suggests that the word “searches” should be construed
more narrowly in that Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment “was the founding generation’s response
to the reviled ‘general warrants’ and ‘writs of assistance’ of the colonial era, which allowed British officers
to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search
for evidence of criminal activity,” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at
2494, “often to uncover papers that might be used to
convict persons of libel.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990); see Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886). These quests for
smuggled goods, seditious materials, and the people
responsible were “searches” in the ordinary sense of
the word—efforts to find persons and things.
Nor was the word “search” reserved in eighteenthcentury America for activities that involved crossing
the threshold of a home or business. For example, the
word had long been used to describe efforts by law enforcement to find people in public places. See, e.g.,
Webster, supra (“to search the wood for a thief”); William Sheppard, The Offices of Constables, ch. 8, § 2 (4th
ed. 1658) (“The Officer receiving a Hue and Cry after
a Fellon, must, with all speed, make diligent pursuit,
with Horse and Foot, after the offendors from Town to
Town the way it is sent, and make diligent search in
his own Town.”); The Conductor Generalis: or, the Office, Duty, and Authority of Justices of the Peace 18788 (1792) (noting the authority of a constable or sheriff
to “search in his town for suspected persons” and advising that “it is a good course to have the warrant of
a justice of the peace, when time will permit, in order

8
to prevent causeless hue and cry”); William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original
Meaning 602–1791, at 320 (2009) (citing English magistrate’s order commanding officers “to make diligent
search” for able-bodied vagrants (quoting Order, 17
Jan. 1705/6 in 3 Buckinghamshire Sessions Records
(Le Hardy ed., 1939))); id. at 322 (citing English magistrates’ report describing “Rogues, Vagabonds, sturdy
Beggars, and disorderly Persons apprehended by virtue of search Warrants[,] in Night Houses and other
disorderly Houses or such as infest the Streets in the
Night-time” (quoting Magistrate Report, in London J.,
at 2 (Apr. 24, 1731))).
As it does today, the word “search” when used in
1791 also encompassed the perusal and inspection of
documents for the information they contained. Indeed,
the government’s pursuit of seditious writings was at
the very heart of the English general warrant cases,
those “landmarks” of freedom that were “applauded by
the lovers of liberty in the colonies.” Boyd, 116 U.S. at
626. In Entick v. Carrington, a case “undoubtedly familiar” to “every American statesman, during our revolutionary and formative period as a nation,” id. at
626, the King’s Bench rejected the notion that libelous
materials “may be searched for and seized by whomsoever and wheresoever the Secretary of State thinks
fit,” condemning general warrants to “enter a man’s
house, search for and take away all his books and papers.” Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029
(1765). Pronouncing these searches unlawful, Lord
Camden emphasized that the essence of the offense
was not the physical confiscation of such documents,
but rather state agents’ reading and examining them.
Papers, he explained, are the owner’s “dearest property,” which “will hardly bear an inspection.” Id. at
1066.
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B. Eighteenth-century readers would not have regarded physical intrusions as necessary elements of
the “searches” addressed in the Fourth Amendment.
True, “[t]he text of the Fourth Amendment reflects its
close connection to property, since otherwise . . . the
phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’
would have been superfluous.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 405.
But the same text reveals that the Amendment does
more than simply protect those listed items from physical intrusion. If that were the Amendment’s sole aim,
it would merely prohibit “unreasonable searches of
persons, houses, papers, and effects.” Instead, it prohibits violations of “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches.” U.S. Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). And that “right . . . to be secure” can be
violated by means other than a physical intrusion.
In the material conditions of the eighteenth century, few searches were capable of violating the security of persons, houses, papers, or effects without also
physically intruding upon them. But even in the eighteenth century, jurists and statesmen who opposed general warrants made clear that their concerns went beyond physical intrusion to include the dangers of the
state accessing information and prying into personal
matters.
In the celebrated case Wilkes v. Wood, for instance,
the plaintiff complained that his “papers had undergone the inspection of very improper persons to examine his private concerns,” and maintained that “of
all offences that of a seizure of papers was the least
capable of reparation; that, for other offences, an
acknowledgement might make amends; but that for
the promulgation of our most private concerns, affairs
of the most secret personal nature, no reparation
whatsoever could be made.” 98 Eng. Rep. at 498, 490.
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In Entick v. Carrington, it was similarly charged that
the defendants had “read over, pried into, and examined all the private papers, books, etc. of the plaintiff
. . . whereby the secret affairs, etc. of the plaintiff became wrongfully discovered.” 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
Pronouncing this conduct unlawful, Lord Camden explained that “the eye cannot by the laws of England be
guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass.” Id. at
1066.
This Court later distilled the principles set forth in
Entick, a case “in the minds of those who framed the
fourth amendment to the constitution” and “considered as sufficiently explanatory of what was meant by
unreasonable searches and seizures.” Boyd, 116 U.S.
at 626-27. “It is not the breaking of his doors, and the
rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense,” this Court explained. “The principles laid down in this opinion,” reaching beyond “the
concrete form of the case then before the court,” condemn “the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security” and the “privacies of life” when “that right
has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offense.” Id. at 630; see Interstate Commerce
Comm’n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894) (“the
right of personal security . . . involves, not merely protection of [a] person from assault, but exemption of his
private affairs . . . from the inspection and scrutiny of
others”).
In the eighteenth century, little information could
be gained about the activities inside a home without
entering it. And because information could be memorialized only on objects palpable to the touch, “[f]orce
and violence were then the only means known” to
wrest private knowledge from its possessor. Olmstead
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v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting). But “science has brought forth far
more effective devices” than those available at the
Founding. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129,
139 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Tools like thermal
imagers and electronic trackers can acquire “information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained” without physical intrusion. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35; see United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984). Modern equivalents of
traditional “papers,” such as audio voice transmissions
and electronic documents, can be obtained without
physical intrusion because they are “intangible.”
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting);
see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285-86
(6th Cir. 2010) (protecting email as “the technological
scion of tangible mail”). And as discussed below, digital innovations like cell site location information now
enable the government to track the movements of the
entire citizenry with an ease formerly unthinkable.
C. In sum, the meaning of “search” in the Founding era—as today—included seeking the whereabouts
of people and their effects as well as examining documents for the information they contained. That definition plainly encompasses looking through cellular location records in order to track the movements of a
person and her effects. “Whatever new methods of investigation may be devised” as technology advances,
courts must “decide whether the action in question
would have constituted a ‘search’ within the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Jones, 565 U.S.
at 406 n.3. When the answer is ‘yes,’ “it is quite irrelevant whether there was an 18th-century analog.” Id.
In this case, law enforcement officials obtained
and examined records that revealed the location of
Carpenter’s cell phone over a four-month period. Pet.
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App. 4a-6a. By obtaining and examining those records, they were able to identify Carpenter’s whereabouts at regular, frequent intervals—showing, for instance, that he was “right where the first robbery was
at the exact time of the robbery.” Pet’r Br. 8 (quoting
prosecutor’s statement to the jury). This conduct fits
squarely within the meaning of the word “search” as
used in 1791. The government “look[ed] over or
through” and “examine[d] by inspection” Carpenter’s
cell phone records “for the purpose of finding” his
phone, and therefore him. Webster, supra. Scrutinizing those records to determine Carpenter’s whereabouts was plainly an “act of seeking” and an “inquiry.”
Johnson, supra.
D. The government argues that this is a situation
“when a search is not a search.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32;
see Cert. Opp. 16 (contending that the search of Carpenter’s cell phone records was not “a Fourth Amendment search”). Relying on the “third-party doctrine,”
the government maintains that Carpenter has “‘no legitimate expectation of privacy’” in his cell phone records because they contain “‘information he voluntarily
turn[ed] over to third parties,’” Cert. Opp. 15 (quoting
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)), and
that the Fourth Amendment therefore sets no limits
on the government’s power to access and use those records. That argument rests on the definition of a
“search” introduced in Katz v. United States, which artificially narrowed the word’s meaning to violations of
“an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” 389
U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
This reliance on Katz denies “the people” their constitutional birthright. The Katz test, and its concomitant rule that “secrecy [is] a prerequisite for privacy,”
Jones, 565 U.S. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring),
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lacks any basis in the text and history of the Fourth
Amendment. “A search is a search, even if it happens
to disclose . . . . nothing of any great personal value[.]”
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). Instead of
continuing to probe for “understandings that are recognized and permitted by society,” Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978)), this Court should
acknowledge that searches are searches, and should
focus instead—as the text commands—on guaranteeing that the right of the people to be secure against
unreasonable searches “shall not be violated.” Cf.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 393 (1879) (“We may
mystify any thing. But if we take a plain view of the
words of the Constitution, and give to them a fair and
obvious interpretation, we cannot fail in most cases of
coming to a clear understanding of its meaning.”).
The Court has inclined toward this plain-meaning
approach in the past. Explaining that “warrantless
visual surveillance of a home” has always been regarded as lawful, this Court has noted that the most
obvious rationale for that rule does not depend on the
meaning of “search.” Rather, it is that “examining the
portion of a house that is in plain public view, while it
is a ‘search’ despite the absence of trespass, is not an
‘unreasonable’ one under the Fourth Amendment.”
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32 (citing Minnesota, 525 U.S. at 104
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)). That approach, more faithful to the Amendment’s text, also offers a clear path forward in an age when technology
and the public’s knowledge and expectations regarding
that technology are constantly “in flux.” Jones, 565
U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
By acknowledging that the government’s conduct
in this case was a “search,” the Court can shift its focus
away from a futile inquiry into how well the average
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person understands cellular technology, and away
from a fruitless quest to identify what “society” is prepared to consider reasonable with regard to the privacy of cell site location information. Instead, this
Court can focus on the more straightforward question
compelled by the text of the Fourth Amendment: Does
granting law enforcement unfettered discretion to access and analyze that information threaten “the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches”?
II. The Right of The People To Be Secure in
Their
Persons
and
Effects
Against
Unreasonable Searches Is Violated When
the Government Has Unfettered Power To
Track The People’s Whereabouts Through
Their Cell Phone Records
A. Whether a search is “unreasonable” under the
Fourth Amendment depends upon how it affects the
security of “the people,” not merely the security of any
individual person. This is evident both from the
Amendment’s text and from the history that gave rise
to it—namely a widespread concern about the general
insecurity caused by unconstrained authority to
search.
At the time of the Fourth Amendment’s adoption,
the word “unreasonable” meant “not agreeable to reason” and “greater than is fit; immoderate.” Johnson,
supra. When used in political and legal discourse to
describe government searches, the term had taken on
a special meaning derived from the English legal tradition, which equated to “against the reason of the
common law.” Donohue, supra, at 1270. Because the
common law, which was thought to embody natural
reason, had rejected arbitrary search power under
general warrants, see, e.g., 2 Matthew Hale, Pleas of
the Crown 150 (1736) (“a general warrant to search in
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all suspected places is not good”), the power to conduct
general searches was “against reason,” or “unreasonable.” See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 555 n.5
(1999) (explaining how John Adams, the principal architect of the Fourth Amendment, was influenced by
James Otis’s condemnation of writs of assistance as
“against reason,” a phrase that was “often converted to
‘unreasonable’ [in] legal and political writings of the
time”); see also Donohue, supra, at 1269-76.
“Unreasonable searches” would therefore have
been understood as those that shared the flaws of
searches conducted under general warrants—searches
not justified by good and sufficient reasons, that went
further than those reasons called for, or that were initiated without any process of disciplined reason-giving. See Gray, supra, at 160-65. That these were the
hallmarks of “unreasonable searches” is further illustrated by the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause,
which indicates that “reasonable” searches are characterized by a good and sufficient justification (“probable
cause”), a process of ex ante reason-giving before a neutral arbiter (“Oath or affirmation”), and limited discretion (particularity).
Moreover, although the Fourth Amendment confers an individual right to be vindicated by those who
themselves are subject to unlawful practices, Rakas,
439 U.S. at 133-34, the “unreasonable searches” from
which the Amendment protects the individual are
those that violate “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S.
Const. amend. IV (emphasis added). By protecting the
security of “the people” against unreasonable searches,
the Framers made use of “a term of art employed in
select parts of the Constitution” that “refers to a class
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of persons who are part of a national community.” Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265; see id. at 265-66 (contrasting the term “the people” with “the words ‘person’
and ‘accused’ used in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
regulating procedure in criminal cases”); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (explaining that where “the people” is used in the Constitution,
“the term unambiguously refers to all members of the
political community, not an unspecified subset”).
Compare Johnson, supra (defining “person” as an “individual or particular man or woman”), with id. (defining “people” as “a nation; those who compose a community”).
The Framers’ choice to guarantee a “right of the
people” was a conscious one. They borrowed this
phrase from the 1776 state constitution of Pennsylvania, which declared that “the people have a right to
hold themselves, their houses, papers, and possessions
free from search and seizure.” Penn. Const. art. X
(1776); see Davies, supra, at 677-78. By contrast, the
influential Massachusetts state constitution protected
the rights of “[e]very subject” against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XIV
(1780). Although the Massachusetts provision, which
flowed from the pen of John Adams, was in other respects the primary model for the Fourth Amendment,
see Davies, supra, at 678, the Framers notably departed from Adams’s approach by protecting “the right
of the people.”
This formulation spoke more directly to “the purpose of the Fourth Amendment,” which “was to protect
the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government.” Verdugo-Urquidez,
494 U.S. at 266; see Jones, 565 U.S. at 416-17 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (referencing “the Fourth
Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police
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power . . . and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance’” (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581,
595 (1948))). Advancing that purpose, the Amendment
guards against the corroding effect on the liberty of the
people as a whole that would occur if the state wielded
unlimited, discretionary power to search and seize.
See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81
(1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Uncontrolled search
and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. . . .
So a search against Brinegar’s car must be regarded
as a search of the car of Everyman.”). “The Fourth
Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right
of the people which ‘is basic to a free society.’” Camara
v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (quoting Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
The reasonableness of a search must be assessed,
therefore, not only with regard to the impact it has on
the privacy or property of the individual searched in
that case. Consideration must also be given, as the
text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, to whether
allowing the government to conduct that type of search
would violate the security of “the people.” See Luke M.
Milligan, The Forgotten Right To Be Secure, 65 Hastings L.J. 713, 738-50 (2014) (explaining that the
Fourth Amendment confers on the people a right to be
“free from fear” of unreasonable searches). Therefore,
the question is whether the decision to engage in a
type of search can be left to the unfettered discretion
of government agents, free of “oversight from a coordinate branch,” Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring), without compromising the security of the
people as a whole.
Historical context buttresses this textual inference. Given the heritage of general warrants and
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writs of assistance, the Founders feared giving the federal government “free rein to search for potential evidence of criminal wrongdoing.” Donohue, supra, at
1194. Such broad discretion was intolerable to the
Founders precisely because of its oppressive impact on
the political community, or “the people,” as a whole.
See Gray, supra, at 146-56.
In Wilkes v. Wood, for instance, the court condemned the unbounded discretion that general warrants conferred on the officers who executed them. Because general warrants did not require agents to identify particular suspects or to inventory items to be
seized, “a discretionary power [was] given to messengers to search wherever their suspicions may chance
to fall.” 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. In Money v. Leach, another of the general warrant cases, the court similarly
declared, “It is not fit, that the receiving or judging of
the information should be left to the discretion of the
officer.” 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088 (1765).
Though few people actually were victims of
searches conducted pursuant to general warrants,
these courts emphasized that the mere existence of
such warrants made the entire nation vulnerable to
them—depriving the people of security against arbitrary and unreasonable searches. As explained in
Wilkes, the establishment of general search power
“may affect the person and property of every man in
this kingdom, and is totally subversive of the liberty of
the subject.” 98 Eng. Rep. at 498. In Entick v. Carrington, the court likewise warned that if general warrants were permitted, “no subject whatsoever is privileged from this search . . . . the secret cabinets and bureaus of every subject in this kingdom will be thrown
open to the search and inspection of a messenger . . . .
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and every house will fall under the power of a secretary of state to be rummaged before proper conviction.”
19 How. St. Tr. at 1063, 1071.
In the eighteenth century, therefore, arbitrary and
unfettered power to search was viewed as endangering
the nation itself. This existential threat, rather than
the damage suffered by any individual person, was described as the motivating force behind the verdict of
the jury in Huckle v. Money: “[T]he small injury done
to the plaintiff, or the inconsiderableness of his station
and rank in life did not appear to the jury in that striking light in which the great point of law touching the
liberty of the subject appeared to them at the trial;
they saw a magistrate over all the King’s subjects, exercising arbitrary power, violating Magna Charta, and
attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom[.]” 95
Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (1763). This general search power
was all the more perilous because it was traditionally
“used to stifle religious and political dissent.” Milligan, supra, at 749; see Cuddihy, supra, at 122-23;
Donohue, supra, at 1208-10.
Challenges to writs of assistance in the American
colonies highlighted the same theme: discretionary
search authority raised the specter of subjugation to
arbitrary power for every citizen, imperiling the political body as whole. “In 1761, the patriot James Otis
delivered a speech in Boston denouncing the use of
writs of assistance” in Paxton’s Case. Riley, 134 S. Ct.
at 2494. Otis declared that the writ being sought was
“a power that places the liberty of every man in the
hands of every petty officer,” representing “the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of
English liberty and the fundamental principles of
law.” Otis, supra. Because the writ “is directed to
every subject in the King’s dominions,” Otis declared,
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“[e]very one with this writ may be a tyrant . . . . accountable to no person for his doings. Every man may
reign secure in his petty tyranny.” Id. According to a
young John Adams, who witnessed the fiery argument,
“Otis’s speech was ‘the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then
and there the child Independence was born.’” Riley,
134 S. Ct. at 2494 (citations omitted).
Otis drew special attention to the danger of discretionary search power in singling out targets based on
personal animus or other improper motives. As he put
it, “Every man prompted by revenge, ill humor, or
wantonness, to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s
house, may get a Writ of Assistance.” Otis, supra. To
show that the “wanton exercise of this power” was “not
a chimerical suggestion of a heated brain,” Otis related
an incident in which an officer, called to task by a
judge and a constable for “breach of the Sabbath-day
Acts,” retaliated against both by ordering the searches
of their houses, “from the garret to the cellar,” for “uncustomed goods.” Id. A later commentator similarly
warned that “if magistrates had a power of arresting
men . . . merely upon their own suspicions, or pretended suspicions, they might cause any person how
innocent soever, to be thrown into prison whenever
they thought fit.” 2 Francis Maseres, The Canadian
Freeholder: In Three Dialogues Between an Englishman and a Frenchman 246 (1779).
Early decisions in American courts likewise emphasized that the security of the people would be compromised if government officers were given broad, discretionary search powers. See Frisbie v. Butler, 1
Kirby 213, 215 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1787) (finding
“clearly illegal” a general warrant to search all places
that “the complainant should suspect”). Placing such
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arbitrary power in the hands of state agents threatened the security of the entire community. See
Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 43 (1814) (declaring
unlawful “a warrant to search all suspected places” for
stolen goods, because “every citizen of the United
States within the jurisdiction of the justice to try for
theft, was liable to be arrested”). That threat was
heightened because unbounded, discretionary search
power inevitably invited abuse. See id. at 44 (“It would
open a door for the gratification of the most malignant
passions, if such process issued by a magistrate should
skreen [an officer] from damages.”); Bell v. Clapp, 10
Johns. 263, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (explaining that
the constitutional checks imposed on the operation of
search warrants arose from “a strong jealousy of the
abuses incident to them”).
Considering the impact on the security of “the people” as a whole if the government were given unfettered power to search is not only faithful to the Amendment’s text and history, it is also capable of ensuring
that Fourth Amendment rights are not left “at the
mercy of advancing technology.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35.
The digital tools employed by government agents today have gone far beyond “augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth,” Knotts, 460 U.S.
at 282, and increasingly exploit the fact that “people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane
tasks,” Jones, 565 U.S. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Modern technology, “by making available at a
relatively low cost . . . a substantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track,” id.
at 416, has fundamentally changed the state’s capacity
to monitor the activities of the people. That develop-
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ment, if left unchecked, will “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a way that is inimical
to democratic society.” Id. The Fourth Amendment is
directed against this threat and demands checks sufficient to guarantee that “the right of the people to be
secure . . . shall not be violated.”
B. Protecting the security of “the people” against
unreasonable searches requires considering more than
simply the type of information gathered in a search,
and whether it has been “knowingly expose[d] to the
public,” Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, or “third parties,”
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. Consideration must also be
given to the means by which the government gathers
the information and the overall effect on the security
of “the people” if government agents were to enjoy unfettered discretion to employ those means. See David
Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 62, 101-02 (2013).
To illustrate, consider the difference between human surveillance and modern tracking technologies.
It may be perfectly reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment to leave decisions to conduct human surveillance to the unfettered discretion of law enforcement. That is because human surveillance is inherently limited in scope (officers can be in only one place
at a time), difficult to conduct on a broad scale (there
are only so many police officers), and thus relatively
costly in time and money. See Gray & Citron, supra,
at 124-25. These features of human surveillance mean
that it is seldom used on a grand scale or for extended
periods of time, and even then only for compelling reasons. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment). That, in turn, means that leaving the
decision to conduct human surveillance to the unfettered discretion of government agents is unlikely to
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threaten “the right of the people to be secure . . .
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
By contrast, consider technologies such as global
positioning system (“GPS”) and radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) monitoring. Tracking programs
that use these technologies have extraordinary capacity in terms of scope, because GPS and RFID chips are
commonly embedded in personal electronic devices,
computers, cars, driver’s licenses, passports, credit
cards, and even clothes. See, Gray, supra at 23-30.
These programs are also highly scalable, because they
can be automated and monitored by computers, and
are increasingly inexpensive as well. See Jones, 565
U.S. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 429
(Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). Together, these
features make granting government agents unfettered
access to GPS or RFID technologies a pernicious threat
to the security of the people against unreasonable
searches, because those technologies can easily facilitate programs of broad and indiscriminate surveillance, condemning each of us to live in fear that we
could be surveilled at any time or all the time.
This Court has acknowledged that the distinction
illustrated by this example might make a difference
under the Fourth Amendment. In Knotts, the Court
held that it was constitutionally permissible for narcotics officers to visually track the public movements
of a suspect without a warrant, even when those efforts were aided by a relatively primitive radio beeper
device. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277, 285. In doing so, however, the Court emphasized “the limited use which the
government made of the signals” from the beeper, and
that the technology merely enhanced the “efficiency”
of what was still a resource-intensive effort to track a
particular suspect’s vehicle during a single journey.
Id. at 278 (noting that the pursuing officers “lost the
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signal from the beeper” at one point and were forced to
call upon “the assistance of a monitoring device located
in a helicopter”).
As the Knotts Court explained, the limitations of
the beeper technology used there meant that granting
officers unfettered access did not raise any danger of
“‘twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this
country . . . without judicial knowledge or supervision.’” Id. at 283-84 (quoting respondent’s brief). Presciently, the Court promised that “if such dragnet-type
law enforcement practices . . . should eventually occur,
there will be time enough then to determine whether
different constitutional principles may be applicable.”
Id. at 284; see Jones, 565 U.S. at 412 (suggesting that
while continuous visual observation of a suspect’s
movements over a four-week period is constitutionally
permissible, “[i]t may be that achieving the same result through electronic means . . . is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy”).
The threat of dragnet surveillance that was mere
speculation in Knotts is reality today. Electronic
devices that are increasingly essential to modern life
now generate, as a matter of course, a perpetual record
of a person’s movements, “mak[ing] long-term
monitoring relatively easy and cheap.” Jones, 565 U.S.
at 429 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). What is
more, the government is often spared the burden of
conducting the monitoring itself because it can simply
reap the fruits of routine data gathering by third
parties. As a result, the state’s ability to track its
citizens is no longer constrained by the need to single
out particular suspects in advance, or to invest the
time and resources that prolonged surveillance
demands.
These considerations reveal why it is not “incongruous” to impose constitutional constraints on the use
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of GPS technology to monitor a car’s movements, “for
even a brief time,” while allowing the police broader
discretion to “follow the same car for a much longer
period using unmarked cars and aerial assistance.” Id.
at 425 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). The
need to devote significant time and resources to any
long-term surveillance is precisely why the people can
be secure in their persons and effects against the danger that police will track their movements using traditional methods without good reason to do so. See id. at
429 (“In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections
of privacy were neither constitutional nor statutory,
but practical. Traditional surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and
therefore rarely undertaken.”). By contrast, GPS technology enables the police to generate “a precise, comprehensive record” of a car’s movements with little effort. Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The disparity becomes even greater when police can obtain
that comprehensive record from third-party commercial entities well after the events in question have
taken place. Such is the case with cell site location information.
Modern cell phones “are now such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor
from Mars might conclude they were an important
feature of human anatomy.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484;
cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)
(“Cell phone and text message communications are so
pervasive that some persons may consider them to be
essential means or necessary instruments for selfexpression, even self-identification.”).
By 2014,
“nearly three-quarters of smart phone users report[ed]
being within five feet of their phones most of the time.”
Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
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As the government acknowledges, “a cell-phone
user must reveal his general location to a cell tower in
order for the cellular service provider to connect a call.”
Cert. Opp. 15 (emphasis added). Anyone who uses this
essential tool of modern life has no choice but to accept
the creation of a continuous digital trail of her
locations and movements. Perversely, the government
argues that this inevitability is why the Fourth
Amendment should place no limits on the
government’s acquisition of that digital trail. See id.
at 16 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 745). That position,
which permits “technology to erode the privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment,” Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 34, is utterly backwards if one is concerned
about safeguarding the security of the people against
the unreasonable and arbitrary use of state power.
When Fourth Amendment analysis focuses on the
method employed by the government and its potential
effects on the security of the people—not just on the
information obtained—it becomes clear why certain
high-tech means of conducting searches must be
subject to constitutional regulation even though
searches for the same information using traditional
means are not. Government officers can follow people
from place to place in search of information about their
activities and whereabouts without threatening the
security of the people because practical obstacles make
it difficult to use this method in excess. But the rise of
modern cell phones, “based on technology nearly
inconceivable just a few decades ago,” Riley, 134 S. Ct.
at 2484, has given the government ready means to
conduct “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen
of this country.” Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283. Unfettered
government access to these technologies, being
inimical to “a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance,”
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Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, is constitutionally
unreasonable. “The fact that equivalent information
could sometimes be obtained by other means does not
make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth
Amendment.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2.
Limitless access to location data is all the more unreasonable because of its potential to reveal “political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”
Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
“Awareness that the Government may be watching
chills associational and expressive freedoms,” and
“the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble
data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.” Id. These concerns echo those of the
Founding generation, which had learned that discretionary search power, when lodged in the state, is
apt to be directed against disfavored ideas. See supra
at 19.
C. The “imprecise nature” of cell site location information, Cert. Opp. 25, does not ameliorate the problems discussed above. Even when the technology used
in a particular case is “relatively crude,” the rules this
Court adopts “must take account of more sophisticated
systems that are already in use or in development.”
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36. The precision of cellular location data is improving every day. See Pet’r Br. 2729. And in any event, the technology used in this case
proved fully capable of establishing Carpenter’s proximity to particular places at particular times. See Pet.
App. 6a.
More problematic still is that the government, in
asking this Court to distinguish between GPS data
and the location records used here, introduces “vexing”
line-drawing problems akin to those that worried the
Court in Jones. 565 U.S. at 412-13. The government
does not explain how precise is too precise, and indeed
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“offers no practical guidance for the application of this
standard.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39. To the extent the
government suggests that this Court rely on such
distinctions to defer consideration of the weighty
questions raised by digital location tracking, the
government merely asks the Court to perpetuate
uncertainty, thereby leaving the people insecure
against the threat of unreasonable searches posed by
these technologies.
III. The Stored Communications Act’s Protections Are Inadequate
The Fourth Amendment sets out an imperative:
the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches “shall not be violated.” To meet that command, the Amendment compels the imposition of limits on the government’s ability to deploy certain types
of searches. The prime example of such a constraint is
found in the Amendment itself, which specifies that
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
By requiring probable cause—sworn to by oath or
affirmation, and evaluated by a neutral magistrate—
along with particularity regarding the place to be
searched, the Warrant Clause “prevents the issue of
warrants on loose, vague or doubtful bases of fact,”
promoting the Amendment’s “purpose to protect
against all general searches,” which are inherently
“obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.” GoBart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931); see Davies, supra, at 576-77 (the Amendment
“did not simply seek to provide a post-intrusion remedy,” but rather “adopted a preventive strategy . . . prohibiting even the issuance of a too-loose warrant”);
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Milligan, supra, at 746-50 (criticism of general warrants focused less on their execution and more on their
“issuance,” “existence,” and “power”). Together, these
safeguards protect the people from being “secure only
in the discretion of police officers . . . engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971)
(quoting Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14).
Similar protections are needed here, given the serious threat that government access to cell site location information poses to the security of the people.
See supra at 24-27. Although the SCA includes requirements that in some ways resemble those of the
Warrant Clause, its protections fall short given the formidable power of location data as a tool for monitoring
the activities of the people.
The SCA permits the government to obtain cell
site location information if it offers “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds
to believe” that the records “are relevant and material
to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d). It does not require the government to limit
the records sought, beyond the general requirement of
relevance to an investigation, or to demonstrate probable cause, or to provide a sworn statement affirming
the facts set forth in the government’s application.
These standards fail to impose sufficient constraints on the use of cell site location information to
conduct searches. Mere relevance to an investigation
does not adequately constrain the scope of the data the
government can obtain under the SCA, either in quantity or in duration. That is especially true because of
the potential usefulness, or at least perceived usefulness, of exploiting such data in a dragnet-like search
for information about potential suspects. See Cert.
Opp. 25 (arguing that cell site location information is
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“particularly valuable during the early stages of an investigation, when the police [may] lack probable cause
and are confronted with multiple suspects” (quoting
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir.
2015))). For example, the loose relevance standard of
the SCA could permit widespread surveillance of all
cell phones in a “high crime” area where the government is investigating a rash of ongoing offenses.
Indeed, under a similar legal standard—requiring
“a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the [records] sought are relevant to an authorized investigation,” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861(b)(2)(B), multiple federal district court judges
over a period of years approved the indiscriminate nationwide collection of calling records because, the government asserted, bulk analysis of such records could
reveal “connections between known and unknown international terrorist operatives.” In re F.B.I. App. for
an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things, No. BR
13-109, 2013 WL 5741573, at *6 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29,
2013); accord ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724,
746 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting argument that the collection “is too broad and contains too much irrelevant
information” to meet the statutory standard,
“[b]ecause without all the data points, the Government
cannot be certain it connected the pertinent ones”),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 785 F.3d 787
(2d Cir. 2015). Regardless of whether those rulings
were correct in the context of the surveillance program
at issue, they reveal the elasticity of a standard that
requires only relevance to an investigation.
Even on the facts of this case, the overbreadth of
collection that the SCA permits is apparent. The government suspected Carpenter of involvement in a
number of store robberies. Pet. App. 3a. But rather
than limiting its request “to only the days on which the
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robberies occurred,” the government sought—and the
court approved—the acquisition of records showing his
locations and movements over five months (152 days),
which ultimately yielded more than four months’
worth of data (127 days). Pet. 4-5 & n.2; see Pet. App.
52a. The records were used in court, however, only to
establish that Carpenter was near the sites of four robberies. Pet. App. 6a.
Moreover, by the time the government requested
Carpenter’s records, it seems already to have had
probable cause to arrest him and seek his cell phone
records for the specific times of the robberies. See Pet.
App. 3a (explaining that a fellow suspect had confessed
and given information about his accomplices and their
telephone numbers); cf. Pet. App. 5a (indicating that
ultimately seven of Carpenter’s associates testified
against him at trial); Cert. Opp. 6 (“The government
also introduced videotapes and eyewitness testimony
placing petitioner near the relevant robbery scenes.”).
Given this, it would not have unduly burdened the government to obtain a traditional warrant for Carpenter’s cell phone records, as the SCA also permits. See
18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(A); cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493
(“Recent technological advances” have “made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient.”). By
helping prevent unnecessarily broad data requests,
and by ensuring that all requests are justified by facts
independently evaluated by a magistrate under a
standard of probable cause, such a requirement would
“have the salutary effect of ensuring that use of [location data] is not abused,” Karo, 468 U.S. at 717,
thereby guaranteeing the security of the people
against unreasonable searches conducted using cell
site location information.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed.
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